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LIMITING RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
LIABILITY: A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING?
Tracy E. Higgins*
Introduction
Professor Neuborne's provocative essay1 on the future course of
the Human Rights Commission challenges us both to consider the
effective use of limited governmental resources and to rethink the
moral underpinnings of entity liability2 for human rights violations.
I shall first address his elaboration of the moral arguments con-
cerning respondeat superior liability. I will conclude by suggesting
that, even if motivated by concern over limited resources, his pro-
posal would have only a limited impact on employers and would
undermine significantly the remedial purpose of human rights
statutes.
I. Moral Ambiguity and the Persistence of Discrimination
In the opening paragraphs of his essay, Professor Neuborne re-
fers to "the complexity and moral difficulty of third and fourth gen-
eration human rights issues."' 3  He explains that "[i]n first
generation human rights cases, where bigotry is blatant, the vast
bulk of American society rallies to a norm of decency. As issues
get more complex, especially when effective remedies will cause
real pain to many, support tends to erode for human rights."4 The
implication is that the Human Rights Commission might conserve
both its resources and its political capital by focusing on less con-
troversial targets.
Although Professor Neuborne does not elaborate on this point,
it is worth considering the precise ways in which both discrimina-
tion and support for human rights enforcement have diminished
over time. It is true that the most blatant (and easily proved)
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B.,
Princeton University, 1986; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1990. I would like to thank my
colleague Russell Pearce for helpful comments, and Daniella Paul for excellent re-
search assistance.
1. Burt Neuborne, Who's Afraid of the Human Rights Commission?, 23 FORD-
HAM URB. L. J. 1139 (1996).
2. Neuborne defines classic entity liability as "respondeat superior liability on
employers for human rights violations committed by employees." Id. at 1145.
3. Id. at 1140.
4. Id.
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forms of racial discrimination are largely a thing of the past.5 How-
ever, other forms of blatant discrimination persist. Overt discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation is generally accepted by
many and endorsed as sound public policy by some.6 The hostility
toward undocumented workers-and by extension legal immi-
grants-continues to generate a politically acceptable form of overt
discrimination.7 In such cases support for human rights enforce-
ment may have declined, but the incidence of discrimination has
not.
Even though explicit job segregation on the basis of race and
gender has diminished, de facto job segregation is still an important
problem throughout the American workplace, significantly affect-
ing the economic opportunities of men and women of color and
white women. For example, the unemployment rate among Afri-
can-Americans remains over twice that for white Americans.8
Ninety-seven percent of senior managers in Fortune 1000 corpora-
tions are white men.9 Only 0.4% of senior management positions
in Fortune 1000 companies are Hispanic. 10 There are only two wo-
men CEO's in that group."' Closer to home, a study of lawyers
who graduated from the University of Michigan Law School during
the early 1970's reveals a significant wage gap between men and
women fifteen years after graduation. Although women earned
93.5% of men's salaries during the first year after graduation, by
5. Although I do not want to underestimate the progress that has been achieved
over the last decades in racial equality in this country, I hesitate to pronounce overt
racial hostility a thing of the past, especially in light of the recent rash of arson attacks
on African American Churches throughout the Southeast. See Emily Yellin, Burning
of Black Churches Tries the Souls of Southern Towns: For One Congregation, Trying to
Regain a Sense of Confidence, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996, § 1, at 14.
6. For example, in his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, Pat-
rick Buchanan pledged not to hire openly gay individuals to his cabinet. See Christo-
pher Matthews, Buchanan: The Us Against Them GOP Candidate, S.F. EXAMINER,
Feb. 26, 1996, at Bl. But see Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996) (striking down
amendment to Colorado constitution designed to eliminate civil rights protections for
gays and lesbians).
7. Anti-immigration sentiment helped fuel support for Buchanan's candidacy
and, along with opposition to affirmative action, was a key issue in California Gover-
nor Pete Wilson's short-lived candidacy for the Republican nomination. Although
Wilson failed to garner support for his presidential bid, Proposition 187, an anti-immi-
grant measure on the California ballot did pass. Similar legislation is pending in Con-
gress. See James Sterngold, Parallel Agonizing Over Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 1996, § 1, at 8.
8. Good for Business: Making Full Use of the Nations' Human Capital: A Fact-
Finding Report of the Federal Glass Ceiling Commission, March 1995.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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year fifteen, women's earning had dropped to 61%. After control-
ling for grades, hours of work, family responsibilities, experience,
and choice of field, the earnings gap was still 13%.12
Perhaps the most direct evidence of continuing discrimination
comes from audit studies in which white and minority job seekers
are given similar resumes and sent to the same employers to apply
for jobs. These studies continue to reveal significant rates of dis-
crimination: Employers are less likely to interview or offer a job to
men and women minority applicants and white women than to
white men.13 Less direct evidence of the persistence of discrimina-
tion comes from comparing earnings of African-Americans and
whites, or men and women. Even after adjusting for characteristics
that affect earnings (such as years of education and work experi-
ence), studies show that African-American men and women are
paid significantly less than their white counterparts and that wo-
men generally earn less than men.' 4 The intersection of categories
of discrimination aggravates the disparity. For example, the aver-
age income for Hispanic women with college degrees is less than
the average for white men with high school degrees.' 5
President Clinton's recent review of affirmative action reported
that last year alone the federal government received over 90,000
complaints of employment discrimination.16 64,423 additional com-
plaints were filed with state and local Fair Employment Practice
Commissions, bringing the total last year to over 154,000.17
Thousands of other individuals filed complaints alleging racially
motivated violence and discrimination in housing, voting, and pub-
lic accommodations, just to name a few. 8 For most of the claims,
neither the moral clarity of the cause nor the importance of a rem-
edy has diminished.' 9
12. See Robert Wood et al., Pay Differentials Among the Highly Paid: The Male-
Female Earnings Gap in Lawyer's Salaries, J. LABOR ECON. (July, 1993).
13. See, e.g., David Neumark et al., Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An
Audit Study, NBER Working Paper No. 5024 (1995).
14. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, THE STATUS OF EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE (1995).
15. Id.
16. Affirmative Action Review: Report to the President 21 (1995).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. At the Symposium, Professor Neuborne clarified his reference to the moral
complexity of human rights standards by focusing on the controversy over affirmative
action and the fairness of imposing a burden on a particular subset of workers to
remedy societal discrimination generally. Certainly affirmative action has become
highly controversial; however, most human rights claims do not involve the so-called
reverse discrimination of affirmative action but rather traditional discrimination. The
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II. A Modest Proposal
A. The "Problem" of Overdeterrence
Although I am less convinced than Professor Neuborne that
human rights claims have become more morally complex, I agree
that reexamining our processes for adjudicating and remedying
such claims is a worthwhile endeavor. It is this reexamination that
leads Professor Neuborne to question the efficacy of damage
awards either to compensate the victim or to deter illegal conduct.
Focusing on the connection between "post-event sanctions" and
pre-event behavior, he criticizes our current reliance on the deter-
rence value of damage awards. He writes:
Instead of expending significant resources to alter pre-event be-
havior by education, inducement or amelioration, we often drift
into a post-event mentality, expending huge sums on detection,
adjudication, collection and human warehousing in the hope
that fear of post-event sanctions will deter unwanted pre-event
behavior.2"
Professor Neuborne offers as an example of this danger our current
war on drugs, in his words, "a failed enterprise that pours vast re-
sources into an effort to stop drug use by focusing almost exclu-
sively on post-event sanctions."'" He also cites the effort to deal
with illegitimacy by cutting off welfare payments.2 2
I find these two examples interesting in the context of a discus-
sion of anti-discrimination law because, unlike civil rights cases, the
consequences of overdeterrence in the examples are visited dispro-
portionately on people on the margins of political power. This is
not generally true, of course, when we focus on the purported risks
of overdeterrence that civil rights enforcement poses to employ-
ers.23 The targets of overzealous enforcement are not inner-city
youth facing harsh sentences for selling small amounts of drugs or
welfare mothers punished for exercising their reproductive choice.
remedies sought by plaintiffs do not address societal discrimination but specific,
targeted acts against individuals.
20. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1142.
21. Id. at 1142-43.
22. Id. at 1142 n.12.
23. One qualification shoild be made: To the extent that penalties in promotion
cases are larger and more cdrin than in failure to hire cases, employers are less
likely to hire protected work~rs. See John J. Donohue III and Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Emptoytnent Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983
(1991). In this sense, the consequences of zealous enforcement of the rights of one
group of minority workers (those denied promotion) are visited indirectly on another
class of minority workers (those seeking employment).
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Rather, the targets of purported overzealous enforcement are cor-
porations. This might explain why Professor Neuborne is not able
to cite any concrete examples or data that tend to establish that
such overzealous enforcement is happening in civil rights cases.24
To the extent that post-event sanctions do not properly deter pre-
event conduct, it is more likely due to under- rather than over-
enforcement.
B. Employers, Employees, and the Division of Responsibility
Although I am not convinced that we face any particular risk of
overdeterrence or distortion of the purposes of human rights, I do
believe that it is worth asking whether we might modify our system
of incentives and sanctions to increase its deterrent value without
significantly diminishing its compensatory value. To this end, Pro-
fessor Neuborne suggests that, at least for cases brought by the
human rights commission,2 5 responsibility should be placed primar-
ily upon the actor who commits the violation and only secondarily
on the entity (whether public or private) that employs the actor.
Moreover, that entity would bear derivative liability only in the ab-
sence of a commission-approved plan designed to prevent viola-
tions of human rights.26
Professor Neuborne makes practical as well as moral arguments
in support of his proposal. I shall focus first on the former. As to
the first component of the proposal, imposing liability on the indi-
vidual wrongdoer, I agree that a strong moral argument can be
24. Of course, examples abound of employers complaining that they are the vic-
tims of false accusations of discrimination, and the media is more than willing to pub-
licize such complaints by focusing on the occasional high damage award in a marginal
case. See, e.g., Dominic Bencivenga, Glass Ceiling Verdict: Employment Bar Jolted by
$5 Million Award, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16, 1995, at 5. Nevertheless, careful studies of dam-
age awards in civil rights cases reveal that they are quite low relative to average
awards in personal injury cases generally. See, e.g., Shea and Gardner, Analysis of
Damage Awards Under Section 1981, (reviewing and documenting the low level of
damages awards in section 1981 cases during the 1980s) [unpublished report on file
with the author]; Securities Industry Employers Usually Winners in Discrimination
Claims, 1996 DAILY LABOR REPORT 49 (Mar. 13, 1996) (noting that employers won
between 60 and 70 percent of discrimination claims arbitrated in the securities indus-
try over the past 5 years).
25. Professor Neuborne suggests that his proposal may not apply to suits brought
by plaintiffs represented by private lawyers. But, it is not clear how such an affirma-
tive defense will have the desired effect if limited to a single enforcement mechanism.
Given the variety of sources of law governing these violations, such a limitation would
lead to the worst sort of forum-shopping in which the availability of the forum de-
pends upon the resources of the injured party. See infra at 1193.
26. Professor Neuborne says very little about what such a plan might look like and
how it might be approved.
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made.27 Professor Neuborne makes this case most effectively by
offering four examples of egregious acts by groups or individuals in
violation of an individual employee's human rights.28 He then asks
why the employer and not the perpetrator of the bad acts should
be held legally liable.
In such cases, when an injured employee can establish employer
liability under human rights laws, she will often bring a claim
against the employer directly, whether or not the individual wrong-
doer might be held personally liable.2 9 Although in theory the em-
ployer may be permitted to seek reimbursement from the
individual employee wrongdoer, the employer will often decide,
for the same reasons the individual plaintiff chose not to sue that
individual, that the recovery is not worth the effort.3 ° If both the
plaintiff-employee and the employer choose not to pursue the indi-
vidual perpetrator, that individual will not be held accountable for
his actions. In short, his bad acts will go unpunished. I agree with
Professor Neuborne that this is a bad result. The individual wrong-
doer ought not to escape financial responsibility for his acts by
shifting responsibility to the employer. Thus, I would support a
27. One reservation I have with respect to this aspect of Professor Neuborne's
proposal is that it has the effect of dividing lower-ranking workers, pitting them
against each other and reducing worker solidarity. One manifestation of this effect is
the struggle within unions over a union's responsibility to workers involved in co-
worker sexual harassment claims. See Leslye M. Fraser, Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: Conflicts Employers May Face Between Title VII's Reasonable Woman
Standard and Arbitration Principles, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 20 (1992)
(noting that arbitrator may refuse, on grounds of industrial due process, to enforce
employer's decision to discharge employee and may reinstate employee or reduce
discharge to suspension); Douglas E. Ray, Sexual Harassment, Labor Arbitration and
National Labor Policy, 73 NEB. L. REV. 812, 815 (1994) (arguing for the need for
judicial review of arbitration awards in light of the conflict among workers, plaintiffs,
and employers). See also Marion C. Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the
Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1167 (1991) (discussing
similar emerging problems in the context of union protection of workers).
28. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1161-62.
29. The degree to the which the individual perpetrator can be held legally liable
directly to the injured party (as opposed to derivatively to the employer) varies. Title
VII gives plaintiffs a cause of action only against the employer. See Tomka v. Seiler,
66 F.3d 1295, 1314 (2d Cir. 1995). However, common law tort claims or state statu-
tory claims may be available against the individual. See id. at 1312-13 (construing
section 296 of the New York Human Rights Law to allow discrimination claims to be
asserted against individuals). For a discussion of the implications of this decision, see
Bertrand C. Sellier and Felice J. Batlan, Individual Liability for Employment Discrim-
ination, N.Y. L.J., Jan.-4, 1996, at 1.
30. See Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1145 n.16; Sellier and Batlan, supra note 29
(noting power of employees to pressure employers to settle suits when individual em-
ployees are named as defendants).
A WOLF IN SHEEP'S CLOTHING?
system by which a portion of the principal liability is imposed on
the wrongdoer himself.
Despite my general agreement with the first component of Pro-
fessor Neuborne's proposal, I do not think that the second neces-
sarily follows. Imposing liability directly on the individual
wrongdoer does not require a shifting of direct liability away from
employers altogether. At best, an employer should be understood
as sharing responsibility with the individual discriminators in his
employ. Professor Neuborne suggests, however, that employer lia-
bility should be considered only if the perpetrator is unable fully to
compensate the victim. 31 In such a case of inadequate compensa-
tion, the employer should be held liable if the employer is itself
morally culpable. 32 If, however, the employer is not morally culpa-
ble, the employer should be liable only in the absence of a commis-
sion-approved plan.33  This neat formulation avoids the
fundamental question at stake in every case in which employer lia-
bility is alleged: What does it mean for an employer to be morally
responsible?
Professor Neuborne's theory turns on accepting the notion that
the employer's liability for discriminatory acts of his employees is
respondeat superior liability-that is, derivative rather than direct
liability. Yet, describing the bulk of employer liability as derivative
misconceives the issue in this sense: it posits a false separation be-
tween the employer (usually a corporate entity consisting of indi-
viduals with a range of interests from workers, to managers, to
shareholders) and the people in the position to commit discrimina-
tory acts.
Support for this conceptual separation of employer and em-
ployee tortfeasors can be found in traditional agency principles
governing a master's derivative liability for the torts of his servants.
According to common law agency principles, the master "is not
subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment. ' 34 For torts committed within the
scope of employment, the doctrine of respondeat superior, literally
"let the master answer, '35 is invoked. These principles grew out of
a conception of the employer and employee (master and servant),
31. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1146.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
35. Id. at § 219(1).
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as two individuals between whom moral and legal culpability could
be divided.
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,36 the Supreme Court specifi-
cally imported agency principles into Title VII doctrine, adopting
the argument made by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission in its amicus brief.37 Without providing much guidance,
the Supreme Court seemed to rule out both the imposition of strict
liability on the employer for acts of its employees38 and the posi-
tion that an official policy and grievance procedure could insulate
the employer from liability when a victim fails to invoke such pro-
cedures.39 In support of its ill-defined middle position, the Court
explained that "Congress' decision to define 'employer' to include
any 'agent' of an employer, surely evinces an intent to place some
limits on the acts of employees for which employers under Title
VII are to be held responsible. ' 40 Thus, the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of employer liability, at least in the context of hostile work
environment sexual harassment,41 reflects an agency-inspired sepa-
ration of the employer and its employee-agents, whether supervi-
sors or co-workers.
Notwithstanding the Meritor decision, I believe that invocation
of this tort-based conception is problematic in the context of em-
ployment discrimination for at least two reasons. First, discrimina-
tion is not a tort in the traditional sense. Anti-discrimination law
does not impose a duty that an employer can discharge by taking
the appropriate level of care.42 Conversely, a finding of employer
liability does not necessarily imply a finding of fault in the tradi-
tional tort-based sense. Properly understood, anti-discrimination
statutes define a right of the employee to be free from the harm of
discrimination. The focus is on remedying the consequences to the
employee-victim, not on the moral fault of the employer. Thus, in
36. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
37. It is worth noting that this brief was filed by the E.E.O.C. under Clarence
Thomas; however, the agency's position in Meritor was inconsistent with its earlier
position reflected in its guidelines. Under the E.E.O.C. guidelines at the time of the
Meritor decision the employer was deemed liable for the acts of its agents without
regard to the employer's notice of those actions. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1985).
38. 477 U.S. at 72.
39. 477 U.S. at 73.
40. 477 U.S. at 72.
41. Under current federal law, an employer is directly liable for all discriminatory
acts committed by employees except for harassment. In other words, when a supervi-
sor discriminates in hiring, wages, hours, or working conditions, the employer is liable
whether or not the employer approved, knew, or should have known about the action.
See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 853 (1991).
42. See id.
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disparate impact cases, we impose liability even absent any show-
ing of discriminatory intent.4 3 The employer must compensate vic-
tims for the discriminatory consequences, whether or not the
employer intended or anticipated those consequences.
Second, whatever the problems of using tort principles generally
to interpret anti-discrimination law, the relationship between the
employer and employee is considerably more complicated than the
master/servant relationship that gave rise to the principles of re-
spondeat superior. For example, when may relationships among
employees be understood as employer/employee relationships?
When an employee discriminates against another employee (or po-
tential employee), he acts both on behalf of and, in an important
sense, as the employer.' He incurs liability as the employer in a
direct rather than a derivative sense. This seems certainly appro-
priate when the employee acts by virtue of power derived from his
position within the corporate entity.
I will grant that the issue of employer liability is more complex
when the discriminator is in a nonhierarchical relationship with the
discriminatee. Increasingly, hostile environment sexual harass-
ment cases involve this situation. In such cases, a majority of
courts, following Meritor, have imposed liability on the employer
only when the employer knew or should have known about the
harassing conduct.45 This is the context in federal employment dis-
crimination law that most nearly approaches the framework for
employer liability that Professor Neuborne suggests. Under cur-
rent case law, in hostile work environment cases involving co-
workers, an employer may be able to cut off respondeat superior
liability by creating mechanisms within the workplace to encourage
43. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
44. This problem has been recognized by lower courts attempting to apply the
agency principles of Meritor. For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that an em-
ployer will be liable for the acts of the supervisor when the supervisor's authority is
delegated by the employer. See Huddleston v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc., 845 F.2d
900, 904 (11th Cir. 1988); Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554, 1557
(11th Cir. 1987). In such situations, the supervisor acts as the employer. See Huddle-
ston, 845 F.2d at 904.
45. See, e.g., Guess v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 91$ F.2d 463, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1990)
(focusing on actual or constructive knowledge); Spark, 830 F.2d at 1557 (requiring
that plaintiff show that employer knew or should ha* known about the harassment
and failed to take remedial action); Huddleston, 845 F.2d at 904 (interpreting Meritor
as imposing a negligence standard requiring actual or constructive knowledge).
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reporting of sexual harassment and then demonstrate that they
were not utilized.46
It is no coincidence therefore that three of the four cases Profes-
sor Neuborne cites in support of his proposal to separate "perpe-
trator" liability from "entity liability" involve sexual harassment
allegations. In sexual or racial harassment cases, the argument that
the employee is acting outside the scope of his employment is at its
most compelling. After all, in what sense is harassment ever within
the scope of an individual's employment? In such cases, a negli-
gence standard-the employer know or should have known of the
conduct-is arguably an appropriate prerequisite to employer lia-
bility. Professor Neubome's proposal, however, would extend a
version of this respondeat superior analysis beyond hostile envi-
ronment harassment cases to all cases of workplace discrimination
brought by the human rights commission.
III. Discrimination in the Modern Private Workplace
Professor Neubome's proposal to shield the employer from lia-
bility if the employer had adopted a Commission-approved plan
for preventing discrimination is potentially radical and far-reach-
ing.47 Yet, the scope of his proposal is not particularly clear. At
the end of his article, Professor Neuborne adds the limitation that
he would cut off respondeat superior liability only in cases where
the employer is not morally responsible; however, he offers no sug-
gestions as to what such a case might look like. Through a series of
examples of my own, I want to explore briefly what it means for
the employer to be morally responsible. Drawing that line should
tell us the degree to which Professor Neuborne's proposal departs
from current law and what the costs of such a departure might be.
Consider the following cases:
1. Company policy is "African Americans need not apply."
Professor Neuborne correctly observes that this is a type of dis-
crimination that is rarely seen in today's workplace (except per-
haps discrimination based on sexual orientation). If this were the
company policy, presumably the employer (meaning the company
46. The Supreme Court seemed to suggest as much in Meritor but made clear that
procedures in place must have been reasonably calculated to encourage reporting of
the conduct. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72-73.
47. Once again, Professor Neuborne offers very little in the way of describing the
possible requirements of such a plan; however, if the discriminator is found liable,
then the plan failed on this occasion despite Commission certification.
1190
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itself) would be directly liable for damages. In this sense, the case
is analogous to the public employment context.48
2. White hiring manager refuses to hire African Americans, re-
sulting in an all-white work force. Here the policy derives from the
discriminatory inclinations of a white manager, not an explicit com-
pany policy. Presumably, under Professor Neuborne's scheme, this
type of case would lead to liability imposed on the individual
wrongdoer and on the company-employer for one of two reasons:
First, the employer may be deemed morally responsible because of
his knowledge of the discriminatory hiring pattern. Second, the
employer may be held liable because, under a properly-functioning
Commission-approved plan, such a pattern could not exist.
3. Based on his own racist attitudes, a white manager passes over
an African American employee for a promotion. Instead, he pro-
motes an equally qualified white employee. Here the pattern of hir-
ing and promotion might not be apparent to the employer. We
cannot assume that knowledge of the discriminatory decision ex-
tends beyond the individual supervisor. Is this a case in which we
can say the employer is morally responsible? Or, is the employer's
liability here merely derivative? Should the manager's actions be
understood as actions of the employer? Surely racially discrimina-
tory hiring is not within the scope of the manager's job in the tradi-
tional sense.
Perhaps this is a case in which, under Professor Neuborne's
scheme, the plaintiff's recovery would be limited to the individual
discriminator, not the company, assuming that the employer has a
properly functioning, Commission-approved plan. On the other
hand, if we assume that it is impossible for a discriminatory act of
this sort to have occurred under a properly functioning plan, Pro-
fessor Neuborne's scheme offers no greater protection to the em-
ployer than the current scheme under title VII and therefore no
greater reward for taking preventive action.
4. Co-workers consistently engage in racially threatening and in-
sulting behavior toward African American workers. Here again we
might hold the co-workers principally liable and seek compensa-
tion from the company only secondarily. Under title VII, an em-
ployer will be liable if he "knew or should have known" of the
harassing conduct. If, under Professor Neuborne's scheme, the
company can avoid this liability by having in place a Commission-
approved plan, the plaintiff is undercompensated. After all, the
48. Neuborne, supra note 1, at 1155-56 (discussion of public employment).
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discriminatory acts occurred despite the existence of a plan. If, on
the other hand, we take the occurrence of discrimination as evi-
dence of the inadequacy of the plan, once again, Professor
Neuborne's model offers no greater protection than existing law.
My point in these examples is to demonstrate that the degree to
which Professor Neuborne's scheme increases the employer's in-
centive to take preventive action is precisely the degree to which it
decreases the plaintiff's compensation. Simply stated, under cur-
rent law, employers who want to avoid discrimination can put in
place an excellent anti-discrimination plan and thereby reduce the
amount of discrimination. Their incentive to do so is the economic
gain they will enjoy by avoiding potential damage awards in those
discrimination suits avoided by eliminating discriminatory acts.
Under current federal law, however, employers still have to pay
when their plan fails and discrimination occurs.49
Under Professor Neuborne's proposal, in contrast, employers
who have an excellent, Commission-approved, plan in place would
not have to pay even when it fails (as it inevitably will on occasion).
Thus, plaintiffs are somewhat undercompensated, but employers
have an added incentive to create such plans. That plaintiff com-
pensation will be diminished should not lead us necessarily to re-
ject the proposal. Nevertheless, by focusing on the consequences
to the plaintiff, we can re-frame the initial question concerning the
effective use of commission resources: Do the gains likely to be
achieved by increasing employer incentives to prevent discrimina-
tion outweigh the costs of undercompensating plaintiffs who suffer
injury 'when such plans fail?
IV. Practical Considerations in a Less Than Ideal World
Having committed much of his professional life to the cause of
civil rights, Professor Neuborne offers his proposal in response to a
urgent need to make the best use of contracting resources. These
questions are indeed pressing and worthy of serious consideration.
How do we increase employers' incentive to prevent discrimination
in an imperfect world of limited resources? Can we make better
use of deterrence and enforcement dollars? It is in a spirit of prag-
matic reflection that Professor Neuborne offers several practical
49. The Court alluded to a possible exception to this general rule in Meritor. If an
employer has in place a plan that is well-calculated to prevent hostile environment
sexual harassment and to encourage the reporting of such incidents, an employer
might not be deemed liable for unreported acts of harassment. See Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 72-73.
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considerations in support of his proposal. I find these practical
considerations more convincing than his moral arguments about
employer liability. Nevertheless, even in the face of serious budg-
etary constraints, I am not persuaded of the wisdom of the pro-
posed safe harbor provision for employers. Thus, in conclusion, I
examine the likely effect of the components of Professor
Neuborne's proposal and offer my own practical reasons for offer-
ing only partial support.
1. Shifting primary liability to the offending individual. Under
current law, the employer has an incentive to reduce the incidence
of discrimination as much as possible by policing personnel and
firing discriminators. Shifting the primary responsibility to the in-
dividual discriminator reduces the employer's incentive somewhat,
but it does so in a constructive way. It places the burden on the
party in the best position to avoid the harmful conduct-the indi-
vidual making discriminatory decisions.
2. Shielding employers from respondeat superior liability
through a Commission-approved plan. There are advantages to
this scheme-employers are encouraged to take particular types of
steps to avoid discrimination. The Commission can encourage pos-
itive and creative steps such as educational programs and worker
training rather than ham-fisted steps designed to avoid liability
rather discrimination. Nevertheless, the costs to such a scheme
must also be considered and those costs are paid by plaintiffs. I am
not convinced that the benefits of managed prevention would out-
weigh the undercompensation of individuals harmed by
discrimination.
3. Making the best use of the resources of the Commission. If
Professor Neuborne's proposal is limited to cases brought before
the Commission, it is not likely to have much effect on employer
conduct-private law suits are still very much a possibility and the
employer would not be shielded from liability in those cases. On
the other hand, to the extent that it has an effect, this effect, as I
have argued, depends on reducing plaintiffs' compensation. If this
cost is imposed only on plaintiffs who file their cases with the Com-
mission, plaintiffs who can afford private attorneys will simply seek
a forum that will be able to give them complete relief. The propo-
sal would thus lead to the worst kind of forum-shopping-the kind
in which the adequacy of relief depends on the victim's ability to
pay.
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Conclusion
Notwithstanding any gains in deterrence that might be wrought
by manipulating the parameters of employer liability for worker
conduct, Professor Neuborne's proposal sends a troubling message
about employers' responsibility for workplace conditions. By rein-
forcing the idea that discrimination is a harm that is principally
committed by one individual against another, the proposal treats it
as an isolated wrong rather than a condition that must be combat-
ted in a sustained way throughout the workplace. The adoption of
a Commission-approved plan is an important step for an employer
to take in controlling discrimination; however, holding the em-
ployer responsible for discriminatory harm to its employees pro-
vides a necessary incentive for innovation in the struggle to
eliminate bias on the job. More importantly, imposing shared lia-
bility emphasizes that that struggle belongs to us all.
